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INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on the underestimated discrepancy between recent optimistic the-
oretical attempts aimed at providing US policymakers with a coherent “astro-strategy”
for space dominance, and the destabilizing consequences for international stability
deriving from their implementation. Important intellectual references supporting US
current space doctrine and strategy can be found in the US Air Force’s élite School of
Advanced Air and Space Studies – which develops and tests the Air Force’s doctrines,
concepts and strategies.
Accordingly, this article will begin by analyzing the central thoughts expressed in the
book that, for the Joint Force Quarterly journal, is “the first book that can legitimately
claim to present a comprehensive theory of space-power”: Everett Dolman’s Astropoli-
tik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age.1 This major work discusses and provides
suggestions for an American grand strategy in outer space by explaining how the
physical attributes of outer space and the characteristics of space systems ought to
shape the application of space power. It is striking to see how close the steps taken by
the US in devising an ambitious missile defense program and in revitalizing plans for
space weaponization and dominance are to Everett Dolman’s prescriptions for the
“astropolitik plan”. In conclusion, it is argued that US strategy via outer space should
be critically reexamined and, without giving up the imperatives of national defense,
states should work on an international legal framework avoiding an offense-defense
spiral toward space dominance and, potentially, war.
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ASTRO-STRATEGY FOR SPACE DOMINANCE
Everett Carl Dolman, currently Professor at the US Air Force’s elite School of
Advanced Air and Space Studies, began his career as an intelligence analyst for the
National Security Agency, and moved to the United States Space Command in 1986.
During the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations, he was placed in charge of a crisis-
response team to find Iraqi Scud missiles. In 1991, he received the CIA’s Outstanding
Intelligence Analyst award. He thus provides the reader with insights on the debates
that shape the US Air Force’s policy and, moreover, that of the US space policy itself.
The development of Dolman’s “Astro-Strategy” can be structured across three
essential lines: the traditional geopolitical foundations of space politics; a critical
analysis of the current legal regime governing space activities; and policy recommenda-
tions toward United States space dominance.
The Traditional Geopolitical Foundations of Space Politics
The author proposes an interesting reconstruction of the intellectual path from
geostrategy to astrostrategy and draws cautious and fruitful parallels between sea, air
and space environments. He first outlines the classical concept of geopolitics provided
by Friederich List (1789–1846), Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) and Sir Halford
Mackinder (1841–1947). The common denominator linking these different authors,
one of the pivotal concerns to his text, is that “the influence of emerging technologies
on geography, in essence the practical shrinking of the Earth, is the foundation of the
geopolitical strategist’ thought”.2
As a proto-geostrategist, the German economist Friedrich List’s main contribution
to the field has been the discussion of the influence of railways on the shifting balance
of military power. He recognized that the full incorporation of this new transportation
technology would fundamentally alter the political relations of the major powers. “Rail
power has no clear parallel to space power, with the exception that as a new transporta-
tion and information technology, space assets deployments surely have the potential to
alter the political and military relationships of the traditional world and regional
powers.”3
As the first true geostrategic advocate of sea power,Mahan believed that naval power
was the key to great power status, and that this power was to some extent geo-deter-
mined. Dolman translates in his space power theory Mahan’s belief that superior naval
(space) power confers, upon the nation that possesses it, the ability to secure commerce
– avoiding its enemies to secure it – and thus the ability to exercise command of the sea
(space). Crucial to Mahan’s theory is the concept of chokepoints: globally strategic
narrow waterways dominated by point locations. It is not necessary for a state to have
control of every point of the sea to command it.A small but highly trained and equipped
force should be carefully deployed to control the bottlenecks of the major sea-lanes.4 In
a similar way, Dolman posits new lanes of commerce and critical chokepoints in outer
space. These are: the Hohmann transfer orbits between stable spaceports (the first and
most important astro-political strategic narrows);5 the geostationary belt and the
Lagrange liberation points; and the Van Allen radiation belts.
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Among the concepts Dolman translates from the geopolitics tradition within his
space power theory, are those provided by Sir Halford Mackinder. This English geog-
rapher and geopolitican acknowledged the historical importance of sea power on the
rise and demise of the great powers, but foresaw the end of naval dominance with the
advent of the railroad. The key dynamic was the change in transportation technology
and the importance of military mobility. As the railroad grew to transcontinental scope,
Mackinder saw that the balance of power was shifting back again to land, specifically to
the world’s heartland – the Eurasian landmass. Mackinder’s worldview in fact divided
the globe into three primary regions: the Eurasian (heartland or pivotal area), the inner
crescent (Western Europe, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, most of China)
and the outer crescent (separated from the inner crescent by water).
Mackinder believed the history of civilization was, in fact, a cyclical tale of alternat-
ing dominance by land and sea powers, and that a change to land dominance was under
way after the Second World War. Crucial to Mackinder’s strategy for Britain was the
notion that, if a state desired control of global affairs, but could not physically occupy
the critical keys to geodetermined power, then it must deny control of these areas to its
adversaries. “To astrostrategists the parallel is all too obvious. The vast potential
resource base of outer space is presumably so enormous, effectively inexhaustible, that
any state that can control it [or deny control of it] will ultimately dominate the earth”.6
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME
GOVERNING SPACE ACTIVITIES
The second pillar of Dolman’s argument is a critical analysis of the evolution of the
outer space legal regime. He argues that the apparent Cold War co-operation between
the superpowers in the establishment of the current outer space regime – that led to the
declaration of outer space as a res communis – was, de facto, established on conflicting
antagonistic bases. Paradoxically, the result of the Cold War competition was co-
operation.
For the statesmen steeped in the tradition of balance-of-power politics and political
intrigue, the practical value of declaring space a human commons was clear. The riches
of space and the full advantages of space control were unknown. Since neither super-
power could be sure of the coming capabilities of the other, it seemed prudent to do
everything possible to hinder the domination of the other – specifically, to declare space
the unilateral province of all peoples while working feverishly to acquire the technolog-
ical means and legal justifications to gain dominant control of it. The rhetoric of space
co-operation became a cover to buy time.7
The author blames this regime for having led to collective inaction because many
incentives have been eliminated by international law. The “perverse consequence” of
these international arrangements, he argues, is that states have been deprived of the
possibility of assuming sovereign possession of new territories discovered and claimable
on celestial bodies and in space.8
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TOWARD AMERICAN SPACE
DOMINANCE
In providing policy recommendations on the basis of the previous analysis, Everett
Dolman states that just three critical steps are required for the US to emplace the
“astropolitik plan”.
1. Withdraw from the current space regime and use propaganda, touting the
prospects of a new golden age of space exploration.
2. Seize military control of low-Earth orbit. From that height above the ground,
“space-based laser or kinetic energy weapons could prevent other states from
deploying assets there, and could most effectively engage and destroy terrestrial
enemy Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT)”.9
3. A national space co-ordination agency should be established to define and co-
ordinate the effort of commercial, civilian and military space projects.
Astropolitik thus provides a military strategy and a legal-institutional blueprint that
should ignite a new space race almost at once.However, “the ultimate goal of . . . Astro-
politk is not the weaponization of space. Rather, the weaponization of space is a means
to an end”.10 It is a means to space dominance. This study, written six years ago, is thus
a remarkable attempt to adopt the political and legal tools provided by traditional
geopolitical thought with the ambition to propose a coherent “space power theory”
toward US space dominance. It offers a space grand strategy for US policymakers to
build upon some of the founding concepts of geopolitics such as those advocated by
List, Mahan and Mackinder.11
AMERICAN SPACE POLICY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
“EARTH DIPLOMACY”
Space Policy
Since the 2001 report of the Commission to Assess National Security Space Manage-
ment and Organization, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, the US is devising an ambitious
missile defense program and revitalizing plans for space weaponization and dominance.
It is striking to see how close are the steps taken by the Bush administration and Everett
Dolman’s prescriptions for the “astropolitik plan”:
1. “Withdraw from the current space regime and use propaganda, touting the prospects of a
new golden age of space exploration”. In 2002, the US withdrew from the 1974 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty. By eliminating a long-standing limitation on missile
defense systems an prohibition, this move has generated hostile reactions in Beijing
and Moscow – the only powers, together with the US, possessing the ability to
launch nuclear warheads on land-based ICBMs.
2. “A national space co-ordination agency should be established to define and co-ordinate the
effort of commercial, civilian and military space projects.” The same year, the Depart-
ment of Defense created the Missile Defense Agency – which replaced the Ballistic
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Missile Defense Organization – responsible for developing a layered ground-, sea-
and space-based defense against ballistic missiles. Always in 2002, President
George W. Bush signed the National Security Presidential Directive 23, which
outlined a plan to begin deployment of operational ballistic missile defense systems
by 2004, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD).12
3. “Seize military control of low-Earth orbit.From that height above the ground,space-based
laser or kinetic energy weapons could prevent other states from deploying assets there, and
could most effectively engage and destroy terrestrial enemy Anti-Satellite Weapons”. The
US has also revived concepts of placing kinetic-energy interceptors in space and has
investigated the idea of space-based lasers.13 The Space-Based Interceptor classi-
fied program, PE 0603891C Special Programs MDA, first appeared in the 2005
budget request.14 According to MDA head Lt. Gen. Trey Obering, the Agency is
starting to take “a hard look at developing a space-based layer”.15 In 2007, the US
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) requested $45 million, to begin in FY 2008, to
develop space-based ballistic missile interceptors that would attack ballistic
missiles in boost phase.
Earth Diplomacy
Consistent with Dolman’s “Astropolitik”, since 2002, the US are setting up a radar
system in the Czech Republic and ten interceptors in Poland. This third site (in
addition to the ones in Alaska and California) is officially planned to counter “rogue
states” (namely Iranian) Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles. The majority of defense
experts claim, however, that it “might undermine part of Russian strategic deterrence
by intercepting the 18 to 25 Russian Intercontinental Balistic Missiles (ICBMs) – the
SS-25 – based in Vypolzovo (Tver), north-east of Moscow to [Russian] strategic
nuclear forces.”16 The resulting challenge for Russian security planners is to maintain
deterrence stability while US capabilities are steadily improving. The more space-
based systems reduce US concerns about the costs of using force, the more likely
Russia is to seek asymmetrical, and potentially very destabilizing, ways to shore up its
own deterrent. China too is concerned that the US missile defense network and
program for space weaponization will undercut its strategic nuclear deterrent.17
Beijing has an even more immediate problem than Russia because it has a much
smaller nuclear deterrent and a core security issue – Taiwan – that could cause a near-
term conflict with the United States. Since China has only about 20 single-warhead
ballistic missiles that could reach the United States, it is concerned about even a rudi-
mentaryUSmissile defense system, especially in the context of the coercive prevention
strategy.
International Stability
The problem is that the aggressive, unilateral tone of these policies and military
doctrinal documents has promoted consideration of counter-measures and space-
related weaponry by the potential targets of these policies – namely Russia and China.
“In other words, the United States finds itself on the horns of the classic security
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dilemma with regard to space: the more the United States seeks ‘hard power’ means to
both protect itself in space and ensure that others cannot use space against it, the more
threatening US intentions seem and the more others will seek to counter US actions”.18
The posture of American policies has encouraged Russia and China to consider
counter-measures. Russia’s plan of deployment of Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad
region – in reaction to the planned missile defense deployment in Poland and the Czech
Republic – and China’s test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 are two cases in point. It
seems, therefore, that US aggressive deployment of a ballistic missile defense system
and its unilateral policy seeking space weaponization is fostering potential conflict
among great powers and international instability. It is crucially important for both
astrostrategists and policymakers to attentively analyze the consequences of theoreti-
cally appealing expansionist strategies for the stability of international relations.
AVOIDING WAR IN OUTER SPACE
Because of the close relationship between ballistic missiles and space launchers and the
possibility that missile defense programs will pave the way for the full-fledged
weaponization of space, control ofmissiles andmissile defenses is intimately interlinked
with the prevention of the weaponization of outer space. Space security pre-eminently
being an issue of global security, it is crucial to avoid an escalating offence-defense spiral
and to accurately define “acceptable” and “unacceptable” uses of space through inter-
national legal instruments.
Several state and non-state actors have long been calling for the prevention of an
arms race in outer space, seeking to strengthen international space law and arms
control by introducing provisions against the weaponization of space.19 In February
2008, at the Conference on Disarmament, Russia and China jointly presented a draft
treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space that was rejected
by the United States.20 Distrust, instability and ultimately violence would be consider-
ably increased with advanced space weapons, such as maneuverable space mines,
micro-satellites, kinetic kill vehicles, chemical and nuclear explosives, or particle,
microwave and laser beams.21 Transforming space from the “common heritage” of
mankind into a “high frontier” for space warfare where weapons are used “to, from, in
and through” space, contains considerable risks for all states, including the United
States.22
To avoid these risks, the transition from the militarization to the weaponization of
space needs to be prevented.23 Comprehensive space arms control would seek to ban
weapons against objects in space and from objects in space against any target, and
would prohibit development, testing, and deployment of such systems altogether before
more advanced weapons are tested or become operational. The Russian-Chinese
proposal for a blueprint for co-operation might, for instance, be adopted. It would be
based on three basic obligations:
1. Not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kind of weapons,
not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, and not to station such weapons in
outer space in any other manner;
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2. Not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects;
3. Not to assist or encourage other states, groups of states or international organiza-
tions to participate in activities prohibited by this treaty.
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, US political and military elites have
invested massive economic and diplomatic resources in implementing a missile defense
system and in investigating opportunities to enlarge (traditional land- and sea-based)
delivery platforms into outer space. The reactions of the United States’major potential
rivals – Russia and China – have highlighted the destabilizing potential of such
ambitions. Accordingly, US strategy via outer space has to be critically re-examined
and, without giving up the imperatives of national defense, states should work on an
international legal framework to avoid an offensive-defensive spiral toward space
dominance and, potentially, war.
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NOTES
1. E. C. Dolman,Astropolitik:Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, London: Frank Cass, 2002.
2. The determining geographical factors have respectively been: wind and current in the age of
sail; gradient in the rail age; and, today, gravity in the space age.
3. E. Dolman, op. cit.
4. He specified the straits of Dover,Gibraltar and Malacca, the Cape of Good Hope,Malta, the
Suez Canal, and the St Lawrence Seaway.
5. What is important in space-faring terms is the propulsive effort required to change a velocity
vector. Because of the unseen undulations of the outer space terrain, the gravity wells,
geostrategy must minimize the total velocity effort, Delta V, by taking into consideration
gravity and the quantity of fuel required. The Hohmann Transfers Orbits (HTO), is a two
step maneuver that minimizes Delta V: first the engine is accelerated into a higher (or decel-
erated into a lower) elliptical orbit; then the spacecraft fires again to circularize and stabilize
the final orbit. This specific maneuver conserves fuel and increases the productive life of the
spacecraft. Therefore, according to Dolman, the future lanes of commerce and military lines
of communications will be the HTO between stable spaceports.
6. In 2004, theCounterspace Operations Doctrine document clearly showed what the US actually
intend to do: that is, to achieve and maintain space superiority – the “freedom to attack as well
as the freedom from attack” – in space. See, Air Force, Counterspace Operations Doctrine
Document, AFDD 2-2.1, 2004.
7. E. Dolman, op. cit., p. 170.
8. Ibid., 139.
9. Ibid.,p. 157.
10. Ibid.,p. 182.
11. The greatest weakness of this work is the scope that this strategy pretends to have. The book
aggressively overflows into the political realm, positing what the overall political aim of the
US in outer space should be. In line with Carl Von Clausewitz’s thought, he states that
“strategy is ultimately political in nature, that is to say the ends of national strategy are inex-
tricably political” (p. 146) and should thus be subordinated to politics. Nevertheless, his
theory of space power is much more than a coherent ensemble of teachings for present and
future space-strategists. Dolman’s ambition for US dominance in space is rooted in a moral
justification. In his words, the US “can advance a broad moral argument for space domina-
tion”, in that, he argues, if the US could seize control of outer space, this would place as
guardian of space “the most benign state [that] has ever attempted hegemony over the
greater part of the world” (pp. 157–158).The implications of Dolman’s attempt is to provide
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a moral justification for military expansionist strategies into space and, thereby, to contradict
the teachings of Carl Von Clausewitz.
12. “Missile defense is only a small component of much more ambitious programs for milita-
rization of space, with the intent to achieve a monopoly on the use of space for offensive
military purposes” (Chomsky, 2004). In fact, GMD relies heavily on satellite communica-
tion. Washington planners know that rivals of the US could therefore destroy those satellites
with (cheaper) anti-satellite weapons rather than trying to shoot down missiles. The link
between GMD and militarization of space lies exactly here: offensive space-based weapons
could, among other functions, protect satellites or even launch preventive attacks. The
weaponization of outer space is intimately connected to the development ofGMD.Lawrence
Kaplan concludes in theNewRepublic that “missile defense isn’t . . .meant to protect the US.
It’s a tool of global dominance”. L.Kaplan, op.cit.On the relation between space weaponiza-
tion, missile defense and nuclear warfare, see Meijer, 2009.
13. See the Space Weapons Spending Analyses by the Center for Defense Intelligence, available at
http://www.cdi.org.
14. http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sbi.htm.
15. T. Hitchens, M. Katz-Hyman and V. Samson, “Space Weapon Spending in the FY 2007
Defense Budget”,Center for Defense Information, 2006.
16. Y. Zaitsev , “BMD Games And The Caucasus Crisis Part One”, United Press International,
28 August 2008. Also “Russian Official Says New US Space Policy Will Lead to Military
Confrontation”, Moscow News, 30 November 2006., http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006
/11/30/spacecritic.shtml; also, Associated Press, “Russia Warns US About Weapons in
Space: Minister Vows Retaliatory Steps over Technology Threat”, 2 June 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8073961.
17. The major threat for the Chinese is the risk that this system would allow preventive action
against its 20 nuclear weapons deployed on long-range missiles that can reach the continen-
tal United States. This would obliterate Beijing’s nuclear deterrent. See,H.Gusterson, “Tall
Tales and Deceptive Discourse”,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,November/December 2001.
18. T. Hitchens, Weaponizing Space: Is Current US Policy Protecting Our Security?, testimony
before the National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, US Congress, Washington
DC, 23 March 2007.
19. For a preliminary overview of the evolution of the legal system concerning outer space, see
Meijer, 2007a. Official reports on the legal framework governing the use of space can be
found at http://www.disarmament.un.org. For a critical assessment of the current legal
framework and proposals to reform it, see: J. Nye Jr. and J. Schear (eds), Seeking Stability in
Space: Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Evolving Space Regime, University Press of America,
1987. T. Hitchens, “Multilateral Approaches to Preventing the Weaponization of Space”,
Disarmament Diplomacy,No. 56,April 2001; P.E.Coyle and J.B.Rhinelander, “Drawing the
Line: the Path to Controlling Weapons in Space”, Disarmament Diplomacy, Vol. 66,
September 2002; M. Krepon and M. Heller, “A Mode of Conduct for Space Assurance”,
Disarmament Policy, No. 77, May/June 2004; D. Wolter, “An International Law Perspective
on Common Security in Outer Space”, Disarmament Policy, No. 81, Winter 2005; and
D. Wolter, “Common Security in Outer Space and International Law”, United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research, UNIDIR/2005/29, 2006. Available at:
http://www.unidir.org.
20. The draft treaty is available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/2813319.html. On the
Russian–Chinese co-operation see P. Podvig and H. Zhang,Russian and Chinese Responses to
US Military Plans in Space: A Report Reconsidering the Rules of Space Project, Cambridge:
American Academy of Arts & Sciences, March 2008.
21. J. M. Logsdon and G. Adams (eds), Space Weapons:Are They Needed?, Space Policy Institute
and Security Studies Program, George Washington University, 2003.
22. J. Scheffran, “Missiles, Missile Defense, and Space Weaponization”, Working Papers from
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, 30 April–11 May 2008,
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Vienna. Available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/NGOpres02/6.pdf. See
also Theresa Hitchens,Weaponizing Space: Is Current US Policy Protecting Our Security.
23. Space has been “militarized” since the earliest communications satellites were launched into
orbit (in fact, since the first Sputnik). Space “weaponization” is generally understood to refer
to the placement in orbit of space-based devices that have a destructive capacity. Therefore,
while satellites may be used for aggressive measures, such as GPS navigation of fighter jets or
precision-guided missile delivery, satellites themselves have no destructive capacity and their
support of military operations would not be considered weaponization. H. L. E. Meijer,
“Unifying Europe Through the Militarization of the Outer Space? Threats and Perspectives
for the ESDP”, Safe Paper, n.1/07, The CIPI Foundation, Brussels, November 2007.
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